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I. INTRODUCTION
The recent Chilean Supreme Court decision to extradite
Alberto Fujimori, 1 former President of Peru, sets international
precedent in the human rights arena. According to international
* J.D./LL.M.-TAX Candidate, University of Miami, 2009 I would like to
acknowledge Professor Edgardo Rotman for his endless help and encouragement in
writing this casenote. I would also like to thank my parents, Donna and Glenn, for
their continuous support, as well as my family, friends and the members of the Inter-
American Law Review.
1. Corte Suprema de Justicia [CSJN], 21/9/2007, "Extradici6n de Fujimori,"
(3744-07) (Chile), available at http://www.andina.com.pe/edpespeciales/especiales/
fallofujimori.pdf.
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reports,2 this is the first time that a court has ordered a former
Latin American President back to his country to stand trial for
grave violations of human rights committed during his mandate.
After seven years of self-imposed exile and nearly two years since
his initial arrest in Chile, the Chilean Supreme Court finally seals
Fujimori's fate with this unappealable decision. On September
21, 2007, the Court reversed a Chilean magistrate's original deci-
sion rejecting the Peruvian extradition request3 and granted the
request for seven of the thirteen charges, putting special emphasis
on the human rights violations because those atrocious acts were
ordered by Fujimori himself.4 The Court carefully follows the pro-
cess set forth in a 1932 Extradition Treaty between Chile and
Peru,' in addition to applying Chilean procedural law and interna-
tional principles to determine if extradition should be granted.
According to the bi-lateral treaty between the two countries,
Fujimori can only be tried in Peru for the charges for which he is
extradited6 - five charges of alleged corruption and two charges of
alleged crimes against humanity.
While some remember Fujimori for his triumphs in defeating
hyperinflation and terrorism in Peru, others remember him for his
authorization of a secret death squad and massive corruption.7
Consequently, this case is important because it serves as a lesson
to other heads of states that grave crimes will not go unpunished
no matter where you are or what you do. In addition, it also
serves as a model for Latin American courts faced with similar
cases. Overall, the fight against impunity for grave violators of
human rights in Latin America should be fought at the domestic
level using international law, and the role of courts in this fight is
to hold violators accountable, even if they are former heads of
states. While Fujimori's ultimate trial will be in front of a Peru-
2. E.g., ANDINA, Caso Fujimori es una lecci6n para los presidentes de todo el
Mundo, sostiene Sober6n, ADONDE (Lima), Sept. 21, 2007, available at http://www.
adonde.com/peruhoy/070921soberon.htm.
3. Corte de Primera Instancia [CPI], 11/7/2007, "Extradici6n de Fujimori !
negando extradici6n," (5646-2005) (Chile), available at http://www.emol.com/noticias/
documentos/pdfs/FalloMinalvarezFujimori.pdf.
4. Andrds Lpez, Los fundamentos de la Suprema para extraditar a Fujimori, LA
NACI6N, (Santiago, Chile), Sept. 22, 2007, available at http://www.lanacion.cl/
prontusnoticiasv2/site/artic20070921/pags/20070921234319.html.
5. See Extradition Treaty, Chile - Peru, Nov. 5, 1932, available at http:/www.
oas.org/juridico/MLA/sp/traites/sp-traites-ext-chl-per.pdf.
6. See Extradition Treaty, supra note 5, at art. VIII.
7. E.g., Jonathan Franklin & Lucien Chauvin, Fujimori Ordered Back to Peru to




vian court of justice, this decision exemplifies the Chilean court's
obligation to facilitate that process.8
This casenote first reflects on the case of Pinochet, which
ended the practice of immunity for former heads of state, and its
effects on the recent prosecutions of government officials through-
out Latin America for human rights violations. Next it will focus
on the Chilean Court's obligation to apply international law in the
extradition process, before briefly touching on Fujimori's reign of
terror and the legal maneuvers that landed him in a Chilean
courtroom. From there, this casenote argues that despite the
politically charged nature of the case, the Court correctly granted
the extradition request following the proper procedure set forth in
the extradition treaty between Chile and Peru. Also, the Court
did not overstep its bounds by applying international law as it had
a duty to apply international human rights law in a case that
involves international crimes. Finally, this article will explore the
institutional changes in Chile that have led to this landmark deci-
sion and the impact they may have on other countries' decisions to
prosecute human rights violators.
II. FuJiMORI FOLLOWS IN THE FOOTSTEPS OF SO
MANY BEFORE HIM
A. The Pinochet Effect
From the late 1960s through the early 1980s countries in
Latin America experienced political turmoil and repressive
regimes.9 During that time, a military junta led by General
Augusto Pinochet governed Chile for seventeen years. Pinochet is
a symbol of the dictatorships that plagued Latin America during
those years. There were no elections, no congress and strict con-
trol of the press. Similar to the case at hand, 2,603 people were
8. See, e.g., Int'l Fed'n for Human Rights, Fujimori: iExtradici6n al Perd o Juicio
en Chile!, n°476/3 (May 2007) [hereinafter FIDHI. In accordance with international
law, the Chilean courts may only decide if Peru has followed the correct extradition
procedure, they cannot decide the merits of the case. Id. at 7. Once extradited to
Peru, Fujimori will be tried in front of the Permanent Criminal Chamber of the
Supreme Court that, after considering the evidence, will decide the degree of
Fujimori's criminal participation in the matters. Fujimori also enjoys the right of
appeal to a separate court. Human Rights Watch, HRW World Report 2001: Peru,
available at http://hrw.orgfbackgrounder/americas/peru-qna-1030.htm [hereinafter
HRW World Report].
9. See NAOMI ROHT-ARRLAZA, THE PINOCHET EFFECT: TRANSNATIONAL JUSTICE IN
THE AGE OF HUMAN RIGHTS vii-x (University of Pennsylvania Press 2005).
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tortured and executed or disappeared." After Chile reverted back
to a democracy these crimes were left unpunished, largely due to
an amnesty law that was enacted by the military government
itself.1 Although the United Nations and the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights found this to be incompatible with
Chile's international obligation to punish those responsible for
human rights violations, things in Chile did not change until the
1998 arrest of Pinochet in London. 2 On October 16th, Pinochet
was arrested pursuant to a warrant issued by a Spanish judge.
Spain requested his extradition to stand trial for international
crimes of genocide and terrorism pursuant to the principle of uni-
versal jurisdiction.'3 For seventeen months Pinochet tried to avoid
extradition, but the House of Lords ruled that he could not claim
head-of-state immunity. 4 Even though Pinochet was never extra-
dited to Spain because he was sent back to Chile for health rea-
sons, the House of Lords' decision set in motion the idea that
accountability for crimes against humanity is the business of
courts everywhere.' 5
While Pinochet's arrest did not lead to a conviction, it signifi-
cantly advanced human rights law, particularly in Latin America,
creating a ripple effect of prosecutions of military officials and ex-
heads of states in national and international courts.'6 Ex-leaders
10. Human Rights Watch, Briefing, Discreet Path to Justice?: Chile, Thirty Years
After the Military Coup, 1, (Sept. 2003) [hereinafter HRW Discreet Path to Justice].
The final report from the Truth Commission determined that 2113 deaths and
disappearances occurred under Fujimori's government. FIDH, supra note 8, at 5.
11. HRW Discreet Path to Justice, supra note 10, at 1.
12. Id.
13. Reed Brody, Pinochet: Justice and the General, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Dec. 11,
2006 at 8, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/12/11/opinion/edbrody.php.
Universal jurisdiction eliminates the requirement that the defendant be present in
the jurisdiction or have some tie (nationality) to the jurisdiction because their alleged
crimes are international in nature and of concern to all states. See ROHT-ARRIAZA,
supra note 9, at 191-92.
14. The British judges analyzed the case in relation to a British law that governed
the immunity of diplomats and stated that diplomats had immunity for official acts
performed as part of their function. Here however, they found that Pinochet had no
immunity from extradition because his conduct constituted international crimes,
which are not considered official acts. See ROHT-ARRIAZA, supra note 9, at 51.
15. See ROHT-ARRIAZA, supra note 9, at 214-16, 223-24.
16. Brody, supra note 13. In Argentina, the judiciary renewed an interest in the
fate of the "dirty war" victims and began prosecuting lower level military officials
again. In later cases, the courts brushed aside the amnesty laws as a violation of
Argentina's international obligation to persecute crimes of such nature. See ROHT-
ARRZA, supra note 9, at 113-16. The issue of impunity was reopened in Uruguay as
well. The newly elected President of Uruguay, Jorge Battlle, created a Peace
Commission in 2000 to look into the Uruguayan disappearance cases. Id. at 154-55.
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would no longer find refuge from atrocious crimes in their official
positions. We have come a long way from the days when leaders
acted as they wished, secure in the notion that they would never
be held accountable. In Latin America, victims of human rights
violations were finally getting justice.17 Chile especially has made
significant progress in recent years; prosecuting former military
personnel accused of committing grave human rights violations
during Pinochet's reign." One of the major cases the Chilean
Supreme Court mulled over was the decision to prosecute
Pinochet himself after his return to Chile. With the myth of
Pinochet's head-of-state immunity shattered abroad, the Chilean
Supreme Court decided to strip Pinochet of his parliamentary
immunity as well. 9 As a result, hundreds of criminal cases were
filed against him. Only humanitarian considerations could save
the former dictator now, and in July of 2001 an appeals court sus-
pended the proceedings against him, ruling that moderate demen-
tia disqualified him from standing trial. 0 Towards the end of his
life, the Chilean state was able to indict Pinochet for other human
rights violations including torture,21 however, Pinochet died with-
out standing trial. Nonetheless, the stripping of Pinochet's immu-
nity was an important victory for holding human rights violators
accountable.22
Since 1998 Chile has undergone landmark developments in
the prosecution of human rights crimes.2" Advances in prosecu-
tions for violators during the Pinochet era are largely owed to the
work of the judiciary, many of whom devoted themselves full time
to the human rights cases. According to a local organization that
provides legal assistance to the victims, "this judicial initiative
has constituted the most efficient, appropriate and productive
The commission's investigations eventually lead to several criminal prosecutions of
Uruguayan authorities as well as a setting aside of the amnesty laws. Id. at 156-57.
17. Brody, supra note 13.
18. HRW Discreet Path to Justice, supra note 10, at 6. As of July of 2003, over
twenty defendants had been convicted and over 300 individuals were facing charges
for kidnapping and murder. Id.
19. Id. at 4-5. Pinochet had the benefit of extra immunity because as former
President he occupied a lifetime seat in the Senate following his retirement as army
commander.
20. Id. at 5.
21. See Human Rights Watch, Chile: Pinochet Held on Torture Charges (Oct. 31,
2006).
22. See generally ROHT-ARRIAZA, supra note 9; Brody, supra note 13.
23. See HRW Discreet Path to Justice, supra note 10, at 6. During the first half of
2003 120 members of the armed forces were charged in thirty-eight separate cases.
Id. See also supra note 18.
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mechanism ever created in our judiciary to tackle a challenge of
this nature. ,,2. Other factors contributing to this phenomena
include recent constitutional and institutional changes to the judi-
ciary that have increased judicial independence vis-a-vis the exec-
utive.25 A weak and partisan judiciary during the Pinochet regime
and right after was the initial reason that trials for human rights
violations were not often held.26 Although initial attempts to hold
violators of human rights accountable came from the executive
branch and President Aylwin's success in setting up a truth com-
mission, the Supreme Court took the first steps in 1995. Two ex-
generals, Manuel Contreras and Pedro Espinoza were condemned
for the murder of a Chilean foreign minister and his secretary.27
Nevertheless, resistance to these types of trials remained strong
in Chile until the military gradually lost control of Chilean politics
and a change in the structure of the Supreme Court took place.
New and younger judges replaced the older, more military-
friendly ones. These judges were more sensitive to human rights
violations and greatly influenced by the work of their European
counterparts.28 For the first time in years the judiciary was free to
enforce the rule of law without executive pressure or military
threat.
B. The Chilean Court's Obligation to Follow
International Law
The incessant instability in Latin America, which led to con-
tinuous coup d'6tats, general political crisis and gross violations of
human rights, has wrecked havoc on the stability and confidence
of the rule of law. As such, Latin American constitutions and
jurisprudence rely on international instruments and the decisions
24. HRW Discreet Path to Justice, supra note 10, at 7 n.14.
25. Elin Skaar, Judicial Independence and Human Rights Policies in Argentina
and Chile 1-2 (Chr. Michelsen Institute Development Studies and Human Rights,
Working Paper No. 2001: 15, 2001). The initial failure of courts to hold trials reflected
a weak and partisan judiciary that favored whoever was in power at the time. Id. at
2. Even as the transition to democracy was made in several Latin American countries
in the early 1980s, the institutional legacies of executive control and domination
carried over into human rights policy. The executive still saw the military as a major
threat to their new democratic regime and as a result human rights prosecutions were
scarce. Id.
26. See id. at 2. Although Chile moved to democratic rule in 1990, the military's
influence over the courts remained strong and the amnesty laws barred any
prosecutions. Id. at 16.
27. Id. at 15-16.
28. Id. at 16-19.
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interpreting them to punish human rights violations. Unfortu-
nately, years later, after "democracy" has come to many Latin
American states, crimes against humanity remain unpunished;
largely because many states have enacted amnesty laws to protect
the perpetrators of the acts. Grave violations of human rights are
considered crimes against humanity according to international
laws. 29 Therefore, international law imposes an obligation upon
each state to investigate and sanction violations of human rights
in an effort to combat one of the most flagrant problems interna-
tional human rights law faces today, impunity." What occurred
in Peru under Fujimori's control is considered a gross violation of
international humanitarian law. The crimes committed during
Fujimori's reign are international crimes that violate the principle
of jus cogens as established in international jurisprudence from
the trials at Nuremberg, Rwanda and ex Yugoslavia.3 Without a
doubt, crimes against humanity are the most flagrant violations of
human rights that exist today, and authors of these crimes must
be punished according to international principles that are pre-
emptive in this area of law.
As for Latin America courts, these same obligations have been
imposed on domestic courts through the diverse cases of the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights (Inter-American Court).2 In
the Barrios Altos case, the Court held that any amnesty law or law
impeding the prosecution for crimes against humanity such as tor-
ture or forced disappearances was prohibited. The Court consid-
ered such crimes in contravention of international humanitarian
law.3 In that case, the Court also established that Peru had an
29. See Juan Antonio Rosas Castafieda, El impacto de lajusticia internacional: el
deber de justicia penal y la relativizaci6n de la cosa juzgada, especial referencia al caso
peruano, Introduction, (Sept. 28, 2006), http://www.derechopenalonline.com/derecho.
php?id=14,331,0,0,1,0.
30. See id.
31. See id. at *1. Jus cogens is a principle of international law so fundamental
that no nation may ignore it or attempt to contract out of it through treaty. It also
preempts any domestic law. Id.
32. See Enrique Castillo Barrantes, El sistema Interamericano de protecci6n de los
derechos humanos y su incidencia en el derecho penal y procesal penal internos, in
JUSTICIA PENAL Y ESTADO DE DERECHO, 77-78 (Javier Llobet Rodriguez ed., Editorial
Juridica Continental 2007). In Latin American, the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights only has power over the states when each state recognizes its jurisdiction over
them. Id. at 75. Also, the Court's decisions are only binding on the parties to the
litigation; however, its opinions carry great weight in Latin American courts and
throughout the years have influenced domestic criminal law and process. Id. at 75-
76.
33. See Barrios-Altos v. Peru, 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 75, at 91 41(Mar.
14, 2001).
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international obligation to investigate and sanction those respon-
sible for the terrible acts, including Fujimori himself34 In the
2006 La Cantuta case the Court reiterated the same requirements
of the Barrios Altos case and insisted that in order to eradicate
impunity, interstate cooperation constitutes an erga omnes duty
for Latin American countries. States are required to adopt mea-
sures to guarantee that violations are not left unpunished,
whether by domestic or international venues that will judge and
eventually sanction those responsible, be it alone or in cooperation
with other states acting in pursuit of the same goal.3 In
Almonacid-Arellano v. Chile,36 the Court found that extrajudicial
executions of civilians were crimes against humanity for which
international law has long imposed a duty to investigate, prose-
cute and punish the perpetrators. The Court also stated that in
compliance with international law, as well as its own case law, the
enforcement of any amnesty law would prevent compliance with
the international duty to punish perpetrators of such crimes.37 As
a result, Latin American states have an international obligation
to remove all internal obstacles that would prevent them from ful-
filling their obligation to investigate and prosecute grave violators
of human rights.
Included within this international obligation to pursue and
punish grave violators of human rights is the obligation to extra-
dite. This obligation was explored in the Inter-American Court
case, Goiburzi v. Paraguay. There, in addition to the duty to
investigate and prosecute crimes against humanity, the Court
found that the duty also included the obligation to request the
extradition of alleged violators if they were not currently found
within the state's jurisdiction. 9 The Court further expressed that
the lack of an extradition treaty between the two states should not
prevent either from properly complying with their duties under
34. See id.
35. See La Cantuta v. Peru, 2006 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 162, at T 225
(Nov. 29, 2006).
36. Almonacid-Arellano v. Chile, 2006 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 154 (Sept.
26, 2006).
37. See id. at 119.
38. See Goiburfi v. Paraguay, 2006 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 153 (Sept. 22,
2006).
39. Id. at 130. In that particular case the family of the victims repeatedly
requested that Paraguay ask for the extradition of General Alfredo Stroessner (the
former President) and Sabino Augusto Montanaro (former Minister of Interior), the
alleged perpetrators, from Brazil and Honduras. Paraguay made no efforts to request
extradition and the Inter-American Court noted that neither Brazil nor Honduras
(where Montanaro was exiled) initiated any criminal investigations against them. Id.
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the American Convention on Human Rights (American Conven-
tion). Furthermore, access to justice is ajus cogens norm and cre-
ates an erga omnes obligation upon States to cooperate and ensure
that these crimes don't go unpunished. The parties to the Ameri-
can Convention cannot grant protection to those accused of crimes
against humanity. The Court stated that:
... the mechanisms of collective guarantee established in
the American Convention, together with the regional and
universal international obligations on this issue, bind the
States of the region to collaborate in good faith in this
respect, either by conceding extradition or prosecuting
those responsible for the facts of this case in their
territory.4 °
The Court concluded that the American states have an obligation
to eliminate impunity through which collaboration in good faith
with each other, whether for extradition or prosecution purposes,
is essential.41
In addition to the Inter-American Court, which is the princi-
pal institution for the protection of human rights in Latin
America, other instruments heavily influenced by international
law form the Inter-American system of human rights protection.
These instruments include the American Declaration for the
Rights and Duties of Man (American Declaration), the American
Convention on Human Rights and the Inter-American Convention
Against Corruption (American Corruption Convention).42 The
American Convention on Human Rights, for those states who have
ratified it, is binding in the area of human rights laws and is also
the central instrument around which human rights law in Latin
America has developed.43 Similar to the international obligation
to prosecute violators of jus cogens crimes, article 1(1) of the
American Convention sets forth an obligation to investigate and
punish grave human rights violations.44 Article 2 of the American
Convention45 imposes a legislative duty to revise any domestic
laws or practices that are in breach of the article 1(1) obligation.
40. Id. at 132.
41. Id. at 192.
42. Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, Mar. 29, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 724;
Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22,
1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123; Organization of American States,
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, Mar. 30 - May 2, 1948,
available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/oasinstr/zoas2dec.htm.
43. Chile and Peru are both signatories. See Barrantes, supra note 32, at 71-72.
44. American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 42, at art. 1(1).
45. American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 42, at art. 2.
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The Inter-American Court has indicated that if the legislature
fails to carry out this duty, the judiciary must step in to ensure
that domestic laws and practices are in compliance with the
American Convention." The American Corruption Convention
imposes a duty to investigate and sanction acts of corruption like
bribing government officials, embezzlement of public monies, and
illegally benefiting from duties as a government official.47 As evi-
denced by the case at hand, there is a correlation between grave
violations of human rights and corruption." Internationally,
aside from human rights violations, corruption has become an
important concern supported by endless treaties calling for the
cooperation between nations in the fight against corruption.
The previous cases demonstrate that the Inter-American
Court tends to interpret the states' obligations under the Inter-
American Conventions in light of international law. While the
Court's decisions are not binding upon all states, they do carry
great weight in national courts. Consequently, these decisions
create a sense of truth and accountability for those states that
have taken the initiative to prosecute perpetrators of such horri-
ble crimes and provide hope to the victims who have not yet been
able to find justice and judicial protection. Chile, as a party to the
Inter-American system and its respective treaties and conven-
tions, has an obligation to extradite Fujimori in order to accommo-
date Peru's obligation to prosecute those who took part in the
atrocious acts condemned in the Barrios Altos and La Cantuta
cases of the Inter-American Court.
To stress the point, some judges in Chile, including the
Supreme Court justices, have cited international humanitarian
law as grounds for reopening cases previously closed because of
the amnesty decree. In the Poblete C6rdova case, the Supreme
Court reopened a case for the first time on the basis that interna-
tional law was superior to the amnesty laws. The Court decided
46. See Almonacid-Arellano v. Chile, 2006 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 154, at
90 (Sept. 26, 2006).
47. Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, supra note 42, at art. 6.
48. See FIDH,,Fujimori: iExtradicion al Perd o Juicio en Chile!, n°476/3, at 10
(May 2007) [hereinafter FIDH Extradici6n al Perd]; Human Rights Watch, Report:
Probable Cause Evidence Implicating Fujimori, 4, Vol. 17, No. 6(B) (Dec. 2005) at 5,
available at http://hrw.org/reports/2005/perul205/perul205wcover.pdf [hereinafter
HRW Dec. 2005 Report]. In Peru, large-scale corruption not only deprived the third-
world country of much needed public resources, but eroded the rule of law, which is
essential to the protection of human rights. The government was able to completely
subvert the democratic process, eliminating all checks on the branches of government
and centralizing power within the executive branch. Id.
382
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that international treaties have supremacy in Chilean law under
article 5 of the constitution.49 In addition, two Santiago courts of
appeals argued that pursuant to the Chilean Constitution, inter-
national human rights treaty obligations are binding on the courts
even when they conflict with domestic law. In fact, some judges
advocate interpreting the laws in consonant with humanitarian
principles .50
C. Fujimori's Reign of Terror and Corrupted
Downfall
Alberto Fujimori 51 became President elect of Peru in 1990,
after running a campaign centered upon the improvement of the
economic and social conditions of the "campesinos" and the elimi-
nation of two well-known terrorist groups, the Sendero Luminoso
(Shining Path) and the Movimiento Revolucionario Tfipac Amaru
(MRTA).52 Fujimori had inherited a government that was in eco-
nomic disarray and charged with political violence, but he quickly
implemented radical free-market economic reforms, putting a stop
to Peru's hyperinflation.53 His next task was to tackle the left-
wing rebels who had nearly destroyed peace in Peru. Fujimori's
alleged strategy to eliminate suspected subversives involved the
49. Corte Suprema de Justicia [CSJN], 9/9/1998, "Caso de Poblete C6rdova /
recurso de casaci6n," (469-98), $ 10 (Chile), available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl-nat.
nsf/46707c419d6bdfa24125673e00508145/883d9745593 118a94125671a00380ca9!Op
enDocument. Poblete was a landmark decision in Chile because it opened the door for
the use of international law in the area of human rights prosecutions.
50. Compare HRW Discreet Path to Justice, supra note 10, at 8, with HRW
Discreet Path to Justice, supra note 10, at 8 n.20. In the past the Supreme Court
overruled the application of international humanitarian law and upheld the amnesty
decrees. These cases however took place in 1991 and 1996, before Pinochet was
arrested in London and changed the political and legal landscape in Chile.
51. Fujimori was born in Peru to Japanese parents. At the time of the elections in
1990 he was a political unknown whose previous career consisted of an agricultural
engineer. James Read, Fujimori's Controversial Career, BBC NEWS, Sept. 18, 2000,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/705482.stm.
52. Int'l Fed'n for Human Rights, Misi6n Internacional de Investigaci6n, Informe:
La Extradici6n de Fujimori al Peri: Un Imperativo de Justicia!, 4, n 449/3 (Mayo
2006). These terrorist groups were communist insurgents who had control of over
60% of the country when Fujimori took over. They operated in "zonas liberadas" (free
zones), making up their own rules, collecting taxes and organizing violent strikes
against the government. The previous two governments had ignored them or
unsuccessfully launched military campaigns against them. Andean World Unofficial
Biography of Alberto Fujimori, http://www.mundoandino.com/Peru/Alberto-Fujimori
(last visited Feb. 29, 2008).
53. Read, supra note 51. While his radical economic reforms initially brought
hardship to ordinary Peruvians, they ultimately paved the way for sustainable
economic growth throughout the rest of the 1990s. Id.
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creation of a military intelligence operative, called Grupo Colina,54
which combined extrajudicial assassinations with general politics
of terror to eliminate terrorist groups and any subversives to
Fujimori's government.55 On April 5, 1992, Fujimori declared an
emergency government which dissolved Congress, suspended the
constitution, and purged several members of the judiciary. The
effect of this self-coup or coup d'6tat against his own government
was the immediate transfer of all legislative control to the execu-
tive branch and the loss of judicial independence.5 ' The newly
empowered executive argued that the reorganization of power was
necessary to combat the terrorist groups and to restore a climate
of peace and order to society.57 The international reaction was
instant and Fujimori felt the pressure to restore democracy. Con-
sequently, he rewrote the constitution and reopened a Congress
dominated by his supporters.58
Thanks to his success with hyperinflation and the elimination
of terrorism, Fujimori was reelected in 1995 by a congressional
majority.59 After the 1995 elections, the Fujimori government
respected the concepts of democracy as a mere formality while
steadily eroding democratic institutions. ° One of his first acts
under the new Congress was to grant amnesty to all members of
the Peruvian police and military for any human rights violations
they may have committed during Fujimori's first term in office.
Fujimori gave complete control of the National Intelligence Ser-
54. This group of assassins is accused of the brutal massacres that took place in
the Barrios Altos and La Cantuta cases. Members of the group burst into homes and
universities in the middle of the night and murdered alleged subversives to Fujimori's
cause. Since then, members of this secret military group have been tried and
convicted in Peruvian courts. See Asociacion Pro Derechos Humanos, Fujimori
Extraditable: Ten Years of Dictatorship, Corruption, and Human Rights Violations
(2007), http://www.aprodeh.org.pe/fujimori2007/ingles/fujimori.htm.
55. See HRW Dec. 2005 Report, supra note 48.
56. Mensaje a la Naci6n del Presidente del Peri, Ingeniero Alberto Fujimori
Fujimori, (Apr. 5, 1992), available at http: / / www.congreso.gob.pe / museo / mensajes /
Mensaje-1992-1.pdf.
57. FIDH Extradici6n al Perd, supra note 48. Effectively enough, in September of
1992 the leader of the Shining Path was captured, prosecuted and sentenced to life in
jail. Id.
58. HRW Dec. 2005 Report, supra note 48.
59. Id.
60. Id. During Fujimori's second term in office executive commissions were placed
in charge of reorganizing the courts and the prosecutorial system, ultimately
assuming the judiciary branch's powers for itself. Another common practice was to
pack the courts in order to ensure a pro-government majority in cases that the
government had a special interest in. Id. at 5.
384
iFUJIMORI EXTRADITABLE!
vice (SIN) to his close personal advisor, Vladimiro Montesinos,61
and ordered millions of dollars to be diverted from other depart-
ments of government to the SIN. These funds were used to buy
politicians, control media sources, and for Fujimori's own personal
use.6 2 In addition, the SIN and Army Intelligence were used to tap
phone lines of journalists and politicians. They also engaged in
undercover operations to intimidate those who tried to criticize
Fujimori's government."
With social tension at an all time high since the early 1990s,
Fujimori announced his intentions to run for President for a third
term. This announcement was met with opposition from opposing
parties, who declared his decision to run a blatant constitutional
violation because under the new constitution only two terms were
allowed. Fujimori defended his decision, arguing that his first
term was technically served under the previous constitution.64 In
addition, popular tensions began to surmount concerning the
excess of repressive national security, human rights violations
and the degradation of the economic situation.65 Despite interna-
tional declarations of election fraud,66 Fujimori assumed his third
term in office on July 28, 2000, only to abandon it a few months
later. Fujimori's downfall came on September 14, 2000 when an
enormous corruption scandal erupted, implicating the Fujimori
government in the payoffs of Congressmen in exchange for their
political support.6 Despite an announcement by Fujimori to hold
61. Montesinos, who was an ex CIA agent, was Fujimori's right-hand man and
executor of his politics. He was also the brain behind the counterterrorism
operations. FIDH Extradici6n al Per, supra note 48, at 6.
62. HRW Dec. 2005 Report, supra note 48.. The SIN handled a monthly budget of
nine million dollars, of which the majority of this money went towards controlling the
television stations' editorial content. Id. at 5. Furthermore, documents show
movement of the funds into Fujimori's closest family members' bank accounts. No
records have been found showing that the funds transferred to the SIN monthly were
ever used for official purposes. Based on the testimony of the Peruvian government it
is estimated that between 43.2 and 59.4 million dollars had been transferred from the
SIN between 1992 and 2000. Id. at 14-15.
63. Id.
64. Brody, supra note 53.
65. FIDH Extradici6n al Perd, supra note 48.
66. Id. at 5. Exit polls showed Fujimori well short of the 50% required to avoid an
electoral runoff. However, official results that came out a few days after the election
showed Fujimori with 49.8% of the vote, just short of an outright victory. There were
also reports of irregularities in the voting process, like soldiers preventing people
from voting and stuffing of the ballot boxes. Id.
67. Id. A cable television station broadcast a video of Fujimori's personal advisor,
Montesinos, bribing a member of the opposing political party to join Fujimori's cause.
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new elections in 2001, public opinion had already personified his
government as corrupt violators of human rights, and subse-
quently, on November 14, 2000, Fujimori fled to Japan. Four days
after his arrival he sent his resignation via fax to the Peruvian
Congress, which declared him morally incapacitated to carry out
his position."
A few months later, in February of 2001, the Peruvian prose-
cutor formally accused Fujimori of bribery and embezzlement of
public monies. 9 The accusation was followed by additional
charges from Congress for usurpation of power and abandonment
of office. Later, a legislative decree was enacted that prohibited
Fujimori from holding public office in Peru for ten years. 0 Five
days later, the prosecutor officially presented charges to the Peru-
vian Supreme Court. 1 Later, Congress lifted his immunity as for-
mer head of state, followed by the issuance of an international
arrest warrant by the Supreme Court of Peru for murder and kid-
napping. 2 Fujimori's extradition was solicited from Japan, but
because he enjoys Japanese citizenship they refused to extradite
him to stand trial in Peru. 3 Since Peru does not allow trials in
absentia,74 Fujimori evaded justice for five more years until he
foolishly, or rather intelligently, landed in Chile. On November 6,
2005 Fujimori landed in Santiago, Chile after a short layover in
Mexico where he laughed at the international order of capture on
the INTERPOL of 189 countries. After learning of his surprising
arrival in Chile, former Peruvian President, Alejandro Toledo
called Chile's foreign minister to request the arrest of Fujimori as
part of the extradition process that was soon to follow. The follow-
ing day he was arrested.75 Peru immediately began the extradi-
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Resolucion Legislativa del Congreso 017-2000-CR - 018-2000-CR, 7551 N.L.
199.179, 24 de Febrero de 2001 (Peru), available at http://www.editoraperu.com.pe.
71. FIDH Extradici6n al Perd, supra note 48, at 5. Under Peruvian law,
accusations against public officials must be adjudicated by the Supreme Court.
Human Rights Watch, HRW World Report 2001: Peru, available at http://hrw.org/
backgrounder/americas/peru-qna-1030.htm.
72. HRW Dec. 2005 Report, supra note 48.
73. FIDH Extradici6n al Perd, supra note 48, at 6. Japan does not extradite its
own nationals, and in addition, Japan and Peru do not have an extradition treaty.
HRW, supra note 64.
74. HRW Dec. 2005 Report, supra note 48.
75. FIDH Extradici6n al Perd, supra note 48, at 6. Legal scholars questioned
Fujimori's surprise appearance in Chile, considering that he had been so careful to
avoid extradition from Japan. Some legal scholars believe that Fujimori's strategy
was to test the waters before returning to Peru, taking advantage of the poor
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tion process, relying on international treaties and principles to
convince Chile that they must extradite Fujimori. On January 3,
2006, Peru officially asked for the extradition of Fujimori for ten
counts of corruption and two counts of human rights violations.76
III. A HISTORIC DECISION PLAYS OUT IN CHILEAN COURT
A. The Extradition Standard
Extradition in this case is governed by a 1932 Extradition
Treaty77 between the two countries, certain articles of the Chilean
Code of Criminal Procedure," and international instruments and
principles of law 9.7  The bilateral treaty between the two countries
requires that the following standards are met before extradition
can be granted: the crimes being charged must carry a sentence of
a year or more in the country requesting extradition," the crimes
must not be political in nature,8' the statute of limitations must
not have run in the country requesting extradition, 2 and the
requested individual must not have been previously convicted of
relationship between the two countries in the hopes that Chile would not extradite
him. See Human Rights Watch, Chile/Peru: Fujimori Arrest Renews Hope for Justice,
(Nov. 7, 2005).
76. See Corte de Primera Instancia [CPI], 11/7/2007, "Extradici6n de Fujimori /
negando extradici6n," (5646-2005), 10-17 (Chile), available at http://www.emol.com/
noticias/documentos/pdfs/FalloMinalvarezFujimori.pdf Peru delivered twelve
books of evidence, one for each charge. The ten counts of corruption consisted of
crimes such as illegal telephone surveillance, misuse of government funds, bribery,
and dereliction of duty. Id. at 2-14. The more serious human rights charges
comprised the massacres at Barrios Altos, where Fujimori's death squad charged into
the home of suspected terrorists in the middle of the night and murdered them, as
well as La Cantuta, where the same death squad entered into a University in the
middle of the night, kidnapped and later killed several students and a professor. Id.
at 11-12. Additional crimes against humanity charges involved the case of S6tanos
SIE. In that case Fujimori is accused of ordering the kidnapping and torture of
"known subversives," including his ex-wife, and falsely imprisoning them in the
basement of the SIE. Coincidentally, during that time he also resided in the
intelligence agency himself because he feared for his safety. Id. at 10-11.
77. Extradition Treaty, Chile - Peru, supra note 5.
78. See C6digo Procedimiento Penal [C6d. Proc. Pen.] arts. 644-56 (Chile).
79. See Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights,
Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123; Organization of American
States, American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, Mar. 30 - May 2, 1948,
available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/oasinstr/zoas2dec.htm; Montevideo
Convention on Extradition, Dec. 26, 1933, O.A.S.T.S. No. 34; The Convention on
Private International Law (Bustamante Code), Feb. 20, 1928, O.A.S.T.S. No. 34.
80. Extradition Treaty, supra note 5, at art. II.
81. Id. at art. III.
82. Id. at art. V.
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those crimes in the country requesting extradition. In addition,
article XIII of the treaty requires that Chilean procedural law gov-
ern the extradition procedure itself.84 Under Chilean law how-
ever, an extradition request is far from the mere formality of
meeting the bilateral treaty's requirements. Chilean procedural
law imposes additional requirements before granting extradition,
such as looking at the actual evidence supporting the charges for
which extradition is requested to determine if the evidence would
have justified bringing charges in Chile had the crimes occurred
there." In other words, extradition will not be granted unless the
Court 6 is convinced that there is probable cause that the accused
participated in the extraditable acts, whether directly or indi-
rectly as an accomplice. Finally, the Court must briefly assure
that the universal standards of extradition are met, such as the
principle of double criminality.87 Double criminality ensures that
the accused is not tried for a crime that was not in the original
extradition request by comparing the requisite crimes in the codes
of each respective legislature. In accordance with the extradition
treaty, the Chilean Supreme Court has sixty days to determine if
both the international and national requirements are met and to
make a decision to extradite. 89 In this case however, what fol-
lowed was a formal process of extradition that lasted over a year,
during which Fujimori was granted provisional release and
enjoyed his freedom while awaiting the decision to extradite.90
83. Id. at art. VIII.
84. Id. at art. XIII.
85. See HRW Dec. 2005 Report, supra note 48, at 23. Note the standard of review
for examining the evidence here is only that the evidence support an indictment and
not that the evidence is sufficient to convict the accused. Id.
86. In accordance with the Chilean Code of Criminal Procedure, extradition
requests are decided by members of the Supreme Court. Id. at 23.
87. Corte de Primera Instancia [CPI], 1117/2007, "Extradici6n de Fujimori /
negando extradici6n," (5646-2005), 18 (Chile), available at http://www.emol.com/
noticias /documentos/pdfs/FalloMinalvarezFujimori.pdf
88. See Corte Suprema de Justicia [CSJN], 21/9/2007, "Extradicion de Fujimori,"
(3744-07), 6 (Chile), available at http://www.andina.com.pe/edpespeciales/especiales/
fallofujimori.pdf.
89. After a member of the Court is assigned to the case, both parties submit
testimony and evidence, usually in written form. From there, the judge initiates an
investigation to determine if the evidence is sufficient to support the charges for
extradition. The prosecutor submits her own recommendation, but it is not binding
on the judge's final decision. See Fujimori Extraditable Proceso de Extradici6n, http://
www.fujimoriextraditable.org.pe/pro-ext.php?action=2 (last visited Feb. 29, 2008).
90. See Cronologia desde la llegada de Fujimori a Chile, LA REPUBLICA, Sept. 26,
2007, available at http://www.larepublica.com.pe/content/view/179259/661/.
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B. Erroneous Decision of Court of First Instance
because of Failure to Apply International Law
After more than a year of formal investigations and testi-
mony, Fujimori's defense counsel responded to the Peruvian
extradition request, outlining the reasons that Fujimori should
not be extradited to Peru. The defense claims that neither the
international nor domestic requirements of extradition have been
met by Peru in order to grant the extradition request.91 The ex-
president's main defensive argument is his lack of knowledge of
the human rights violations that were committed under his com-
mand. He portrays himself as a humble math professor, unversed
in the tricky world of military politics. However, he keenly leaves
out the self-coup that dissolved Congress and suspended the Con-
stitution fifteen years ago.92 Moreover, the pleadings take care not
to mention Montesinos, Fujimori's former personal advisor and
coincidently the leader of the squadron of death, Grupo Colina.93
Instead, Fujimori blames the massacres at Barrios Altos and La
Cantuta on the entire Peruvian Armed Forces, portraying himself
as a decorative presidential figure and an outsider to the political
system.94
After the Chilean prosecutor delivered her recommendation
to extradite95 and as impatience grew around the world, Judge
Orlando Alvarez boldly rejects Peru's extradition request for
Fujimori.96 Oddly enough, he initially invalidates Fujimori's pro-
cedural defenses, but denies the extradition request because he
claims that either the crimes accused of had the statute of limita-
tions run on them or there was not enough evidence to connect
91. Defs. Resp. to Extradition Req., February 28, 2007, available at http://www.
caretas.com.pe/docs/alegato-fujimori.pdf. See also supra Part III.A.
92. Patricia Caycho, Insultante Alegato, CARETAS (Peru), Mar. 31, 2007 at 12,
available at http://www.caretas.com.pe/Main.asp?T=3082&S=&id=12&idE=716&idS
To=0&idA=25404.
93. Id. at 12, 14-15.
94. Id. at 16.
95. The Chilean prosecutor, Monica Maldonado recommended the extradition of
Fujimori on June 7, 2007 for two counts of human rights violations and eight counts of
corruption. Maldonado concluded that the Peruvian extradition request had provided
sufficient evidence to establish probable cause that Fujimori was connected to and
participated in the alleged offenses. See Prosecutor's Report, June 7, 2007, http://
www.emol.com/noticias/documentos/pdfs/Informe-fujimori-07.pdf.
96. Corte de Primera Instancia [CPI], 11/7/2007, "Extradici6n de Fujimori /
negando extradici6n," (5646-2005) (Chile), available at http://www.emol.com/noticias/
documentos/pdfs/FalloMinalvarezFujimori.pdf.
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Fujimori to the alleged crimes. 7 Human rights organizations
along with Latin American jurists immediately declared the deci-
sion a moral blow to the judicial process and to the battle against
impunity for human rights violators." One of the main argu-
ments formulated against this erroneous decision centered on the
fact that aside from Alvarez ignoring key pieces of evidence con-
cerning Fujimori's participation in the crimes, he confused the evi-
dentiary standard for extradition under Chilean law. Under
Chilean law, the evidence must be sufficient to establish probable
cause to file charges against the defendant and not whether there
is sufficient evidence to convict, something that should be deter-
mined later by Peruvian courts.9 9 Another factor that may have
contributed to such a low blow for the Chilean judiciary is the
highly charged political nature of this decision. The President of
Chile rejects the notion that the judiciary is anything but indepen-
dent in their decisionmaking. 10 However, a Chilean congressman,
Victor Garcia Belainde, contributed Alvarez's decision to Chile's
favorable relationship with Japan.101
Peru immediately appealed Alvarez's decision.?° In the
months to follow, while the world anxiously awaited the final deci-
sion of the Chilean Supreme Court, legal analysis surfaced criti-
quing the lower court's decision and laying out the proper
Supreme Court analysis that should follow. A report from the
97. See Poder Judicial, Ministro Orlando Alvarez rechaza solicitud de extradici6n
de Alberto Fujimori (July 11, 2007), www.poderjudicial.cl/txtnews.php?cod=1009.
98. See Human Rights Watch, Chile: Flawed Decision Not to Extradite Fujimori
(July 11, 2003) [hereinafter HRW Flawed Decisi6n]; Insituto de Defensa Legal, Carlos
Rivera Paz: La extradici6n que se vuelve absoluci6n (July 11, 2007), available at http:/
/www.derechos.org/nizkor/peru/doc/rivera.html; Amnesty, Int'l, Caso Fujimori: la
Corte Suprema de Justicia debe observar las obligaciones de derecho internacional
contraidas por Chile, Al Index AFR 22/006/2007, Aug. 2007; Instituto de Democracia y
Derechos Humanos de la Pontificia Universidad Cat6lica del Peril, Caso Fujimori:
Andlisis juridico de la sentencia del Ministro Orlando Alvarez (Sept. 5, 2007)
[hereinafter idehpucp], available at http://www.pucp.edu.pe/idehpucp/images/docs/
informe%20idehpucp%20extradici%F3n%20de%20fujimori%20final.pdf.
99. See HRW Flawed Decision, supra note 98.
100. La presidenta de Chile neg6 presiones al Poder Judicial a favor de Fujimori, EL
COMERCIO, July 11, 2007, available at http://www.elcomercio.com.pe/EdicionOnline/
HTML/olEcPortada2007-07-1 iolEcPortada0414249.html.
101. A Chile le interesa ser mds amigo de Jap6n que de Perd, dice Garcia Belaunde,
EL COMERCIO, July 11, 2007, available at http://www.elcomercio.com.pe/Edicion
Online/HTML/olEcUltimas/2007-07-11/olEcUltimasO4l4263.html. Japan originally
thought to save Fujimori from the extradition request by allowing him to run for
senator in Japan. Id.
102. According to article 654 of the Chilean Criminal Code of Procedure, the
decision may be appealed before a panel of the same court, and then that decision is
final. C6d. Proc. Pen. art. 654 (Chile).
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Instituto de Democracia y Derechos Humanos at Pontificia
Universidad Catolica del Peru elaborates on the diverse errors
made by the court in both Chilean and international law. 103
According to the report, Judge Alvarez's main error is his failure
to apply international law, including the international conven-
tions governing human rights and the decisions of the Inter-Amer-
ican Court of Human Rights. °4 Alvarez's other major error, the
issue on appeal in the Supreme Court, is the erroneous interpreta-
tion of the article 647 standard. He confuses the term "indicio
razonable" (probable cause) with "prueba suficiente" (substantial
evidence to convict). Article 647 only requires that the evidence
provide probable cause for an indictment, because to the contrary,
the Judge would be determining Fujimori's guilt in the matter,
something that should be left to a Peruvian court.0 '
The expectations of the Chilean Supreme Court on appeal
have also been clearly set out in a report from Amnesty Interna-
tional in August of 2007.16 Of those expectations is the clear obli-
gation of the Court to take into consideration, as they have in
various occasions,0 7 international law when determining the fate
of Fujimori.108 Amnesty's report points out that Alvarez's determi-
nation that the statute of limitations had run on certain crimes
contravenes an erge omnes obligation in international law, and
proceeds to list the Inter-American Court of Human Rights' cases
holding that crimes against humanity do not have a statute of lim-
itations.1 9 The rationale behind this international principle rests
103. See idehpucp, supra note 98.
104. See idehpucp, supra note 98, at 2. In La Cantuta case, the Court expressly
provided that within Peru's obligations to prosecute the perpetrators of this horrible
crime, was the obligation to include Fujimori in those prosecutions because the Court
recognized him as a principal actor in the atrocities. See La Cantuta v. Peru, 2006
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 162, at 80-81 (Nov. 29, 2006).
105. See idehpucp, supra note 98, at 2, 12.
106. See Amnesty Int'l, supra note 98.
107. See Corte Suprema de Justicia [CSJNI, 3/10/2006, "Caso Villa Grimaldi,"
(Chile) (concluding that an international convention that Chile was not a signatory
party to was still persuasive for the courts); Corte de Apelaciones de Santiago [CA],
10/4/2006, "Caso de desaparicion," (24.471-2005) (Chile) (recognizing the supremacy
of international law over domestic law, so that domestic law may not impose any
barriers to complying in good faith with international obligations).
108. See Amnesty Int'l, supra note 98, at 2.
109. See Amnesty Int'l, supra note 98, at 3-10. In the Barrios Altos case the Inter-
American Court concluded that grave violations against human rights, like torture,
extra-judicial killings and forced disappearances have no statute of limitations.
Barrios-Altos v. Peru, 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 75, at I 41(Mar. 14, 2001);
see also Caso Blanco Romero v. Venezuela, 2005 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 138,
at 98 (Nov. 28, 2005); Hermanos Gomez Paquiyauri v. Peru, 2004 Inter-Am. Ct.
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upon the obligation of all states to investigate and prosecute jus
cogens crimes like those committed here.1 ' Additionally,
Amnesty's report criticizes Alvarez's determination that the evi-
dence did not support Fujimori's participation in the alleged
crimes because not one witness could affirmatively claim that they
received orders directly from Fujimori."' Amnesty notes that
extradition is a simple process, not a substantive hearing, and
therefore, the evidence does not need to support nor does the judge
need to determine Fujimori's guilt in the matter. Accordingly, cir-
cumstantial evidence is sufficient for an extradition proceeding.11 2
This standard is also found in the Bustamante Code,'13 although
Alvarez fails to make reference to it here.
C. The Historic Decision
The Pinochet case in London announced to the world that
grave violators of human rights could no longer hide and set the
stage for future prosecutions of ex-heads of states. Fujimori's case
was the next logical step in the international saga of human rights
violations, and what better place for the saga to unfold than in
Chile where the Supreme Court could finish what they did not
accomplish with Pinochet. The Supreme Court's decision respects
and reiterates the international obligation in humanitarian law to
facilitate cooperation between nation states in order to bring vio-
lators to justice. It is clear that the Court could not deny the
extradition of Fujimori without risking the reputation of Chile and
forever condemning it as a country of refuge for impunity. This
landmark decision in international humanitarian law is divided
into two parts. Part one deals with general considerations con-
cerning the extradition process and the requirements needed to
grant the request. Part two addresses each charge formulated by
H.R. (ser. C) No. 110, at T 151(July 8, 2004); Bulacio v. Argentina 2003 Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. C) No. 100, at 116 (Sept. 18, 2003); Trujillo Oroza v. Bolivia 2002 Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 64, at 106 (Feb. 27, 2002).
110. See Amnesty Int'l, supra note 98, at 3.
111. See Amnesty Int'l, supra note 98, at 10.
112. See Amnesty Int'l, supra note 98, at 10-11.
113. See The Convention on Private International Law (Bustamante Code), art.
395(1), Feb. 20, 1928, O.A.S.T.S. No. 34. The Bustamante Code represents an attempt
to unify the various laws of Latin America into one comprehensive body of law.
Unfortunately, it lacked the requisite approval of many of the Latin American
countries, but it remains the most comprehensive normative framework of Latin
American law in the area of private international law. Alejandro M. Garro,




Peru in the extradition request, analyzing the evidence presented
to determine if it is sufficient to meet the standards of the Chilean
process for extradition,"' allowing Chile to extradite Fujimori.
The underlying tone of the decision is clear however, international
law is imperative.
In part one of this historic decision Fujimori and his defense
dispute the extradition request, alleging that it fails to meet the
necessary requirements under international treaties and national
law. The defense offers five arguments 1 5 for consideration: Peru
did not follow the correct internal process as set forth in the Chil-
ean extradition laws; the extradition request did not comply with
the international principle of double criminality; the majority of
charges against Fujimori had the statute of limitations run on
them; the request was a flagrant violation of Fujimori's rights to
due process, presumption of innocence and basic principles of
criminal law; the evidence was not sufficient to establish
Fujimori's participation in the alleged acts as required by article
647(3) of the Chilean Code of Criminal Procedure."6 In response
to these unfounded accusations, the Supreme Court is quick to
apply a mixture of domestic procedural law with international
substantive law. After all, according to some legal scholars, extra-
dition, which is backed by valid international principles and laws,
is really a procedural instrument used by one state to assist
another in the search for justice."7
D. The Extradition Standards were Properly Applied
1. Chile's Internal Requirements for Extradition
As the bilateral extradition treaty between the two countries
expressly provides that the extradition process must follow the
114. See supra Part III.A.
115. Fujimori claimed head-of-state immunity from prosecution as well. The Court
of First Instance rejected his claim, noting that neither international nor Chilean law
mentioned immunity from extradition for ex-heads of states. See Corte de Primera
Instancia [CPI], 11/7/2007, "Extradici6n de Fujimori / negando extradici6n," (5646-
2005), 53 (Chile), available at http://www.emol.com/noticias/documentos/pdfs/Fallo
MinalvarezFujimori.pdf.
116. See Def.'s Resp. to Extradition Req. 3-4, Feb. 28, 2007, available at http:/www.
caretas.com.pe/docs/alegato-fujimori.pdf.
117. JUAN CARLos FERRE OLIVE, CRIMEN INTERNATIONAL Y JURISDICCION
INTERNACIONAL 188 (Tirant lo Blanch 2000); JosE HURTADO Pozo, MANUAL DE
DERECHO PENAL 260 (Eddili 1987); VICTOR PRADO SALDARRIAGA, CRIMINALIDAD
ORGANIZADA 271 (Idemsa 2006); ANTONIO QUINTANO RIPOLLES, TRATADO DE DERECHO
PENAL INTERNACIONAL E INTERNACIONAL PENAL 196 (Madrid 1957).
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laws of the country where the accused seeks refuge,'18 the stan-
dards of Chilean domestic law have to be applied to determine if
extradition is proper. First, the defense contends that Peru did
not properly follow the procedure laid out in article 274 of Chile's
Code of Criminal Procedure,'19 which requires that before an
indictment can be brought the accused must be allowed to make a
statement on his behalf.1 20 This means that before the Peruvian
prosecutor could initially bring charges against Fujimori in Peru
the ex-dictator had to actually be present in the country to refute
the charges.'2 ' This procedural formality facilitates the satisfac-
tion of Chile's probable cause requirement in article 647(3), which
is used to ascertain the accused's participation in the alleged
acts.122 The defense points out that the original indictment
brought by the Peruvian prosecutor failed to follow the article 274
requirement and since Peru is then in noncompliance with the
requirements of the bilateral treaty, the extradition request
should be blocked.123
The Court cleverly notes that since Fujimori was trying to
avoid a potential indictment by fleeing the country, Chile's Code of
Criminal Procedure does not require that he be allowed to make a
statement before an indictment is brought against him. 24 Also,
the Court invokes the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
which postulates that one party to an extradition request cannot
invoke domestic law requirements as a justification for noncompli-
ance with the treaty requirements. 25 Moreover, the Court notes
that the correct evidentiary standard used to assess if article
647(3) is met is probable cause to believe that the accused partici-
pated in the alleged crimes, whether directly or as an accomplice,
and not conclusive evidence of the person's guilt through actual
118. Extradition Treaty, supra note 5, at art. XIII.
119. C6d. Proc. Pen. art. 274 (Chile).
120. See Def.'s Resp. to Extradition Req. 37-38.
121. This argument is completely circular and idiotic as Peru wouldn't even be
asking for Fujimori's extradition in the first place if he had been present in the
country during the original indictment.
122. See Def.'s Resp. to Extradition Req. 38.
123. See Def.'s Resp. to Extradition Req. 40-43. Failure to comply with Chilean
procedural law would violate article XIII of the extradition treaty and block the
extradition request.
124. See Corte Suprema de Justicia [CSJN], 21/9/2007, "Extradici6n de Fujimori,"
(3744-07), 4 (Chile), available at http://www.andina.com.pe/edpespeciales/especiales/
fallofujimori.pdf.




statements they have made. 126 A similar standard is found in the
Bustamante Code.12 ' Upon reviewing the extradition request, the
Court determines that the allegations, despite the absence of a
statement from Fujimori, were justly founded. A thorough inves-
tigation was performed before formulating each allegation, consti-
tuting the basis of what Chile considers a fair process, even if Peru
lacks a similar procedural requirement to their article 274.121
2. Double Criminality
An international axiom in the law of extradition is that the
requirements of the double criminality principle be met. 129 This
principle requires that a crime for which extradition is sought be
punishable in both the requested and the requesting states.30 It
is not necessary that the crime be described with the same name
in both countries, but only that the material elements of the crime
define a foreseeable punishable act for both countries' legisla-
tures. 31 The defense in turn argues that while Peru sought extra-
dition for crimes that are also punishable under the Chilean
legislation, when the actual evidence supporting the charges is
examined it clearly defines other crimes that are of a less severe
nature.'32 As a result, many of the less severe crimes for which the
evidence actually supports an indictment do not carry a minimum
penalty of a year or more of incarceration as required by the extra-
dition treaty."3 Therefore, the defense concludes that the extradi-
tion requirements have not been met.14  In support of this
argument, the defense cites a recent case similar to this one where
an extradition request was denied for failure to meet the double
criminality requirement. There, the court expressed that the
double criminality requirement for extradition goes beyond simply
matching the nature of the crime set forth in the extradition
request, but demands also matching the exact elements of the
126. Id. at 4-5.
127. See The Convention on Private International Law (Bustamante Code), art.
365(1), Feb. 20, 1928, O.A.S.T.S. No. 34.
128. See CSJN, "Extradici6n de Fujimori," at 5.
129. Id. at 6.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 7 (citing Luis JIM8NEZ DE ASUA, TRATADO DE DERECHO PENAL 943
(Editorial Losada 1964); ALDO MONSAIVE MULLER, DERECHO INTERNACIONAL PRIVADO
252 (2d ed.) (Santiago 2007).
132. See Def.'s Resp. to Extradition Req. 52-58.
133. See Def.'s Resp. to Extradition Req. 58; Extradition Treaty, supra note 5, at
art. II.
134. See Def.'s Resp. to Extradition Req. 54.
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crime as expressed by each legislature to make sure that the
accused is not tried for a different crime after he is extradited. 13
5
While the Court acknowledges their current precedent on
double criminality, it also reasons that the principle does not have
to be so precise and that an error of this type should not invalidate
the extradition request. 13 Next, as the extradition treaty between
the two countries does not specify such a requisite, the Court cites
to several regional treaties for support. The Bustamante Code
and the Convention of Montevideo simply indicate that the
requesting state specify the exact crime of the accused.'37 Addi-
tionally, articles 353 and 354 of the Bustamante Code require the
requesting state to perform a mere provisional review of the ele-
ments of the crime so that if the Chilean court qualifies it as
another type of crime the extradition is still permitted. 3 8 In accor-
dance with the Court's obligation to use domestic law, article
647(2) specifies that when determining if a crime is extraditable
the Court should follow the present treaties in force, and if that
fails it should conform to the principles of international law.139 As
a result of the duty to conform to international standards, the
Court determines that the double criminality principle has not
been infringed. The fact that Peru has erred by generally classify-
ing some of the alleged crimes instead of according to the Chilean
135. Def's Resp. to Extradition Req. 53-54 (citing Corte Suprema de Justicia
[CSJN], 24/05/2005, "Eduardo Martin Calmell del Solar Diaz / rechazo de
extradici6n," (2.139-2004) (Chile)). This also goes towards the principle of specialty,
which is another principle of customary international law that prohibits the
prosecution for any offence other than that for which the extradition request is
granted. The principle of specialty is important because it prevents the requesting
state from using the extradition process for an impermissible purpose and in effect
protects the rights of the individual being extradited. Gaven Griffith & Claire Harris,
Recent Developments in the Law of Extradition, MELBOURNE J. INT'L. LAw 1, 10-12
(2005), available at http://bar.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbJIL/2005/2.html.
136. See CSJN, "Extradici6n de Fujimori," at 7.
137. See Montevideo Convention on Extradition art. 5(a) & (b), Dec. 26, 1933,
O.A.S.T.S. No. 34; The Convention on Private International Law (Bustamante Code)
art. 365(3), Feb. 20, 1928, O.A.S.T.S. No. 34. This requirement is more indicative of
the specialty principle that prevents the accused from later being tried for a crime
that was not present in the extradition request. See CSJN, "Extradici6n de Fujimori,"
at 7-8.
138. See Bustamante Code, supra note 136, at arts. 353-54.
139. See CSJN, "Extradicifn de Fujimori," at 7. In modern practice, the severity of
certain international crimes, especially crimes against humanity, point to a more
lenient application of the double criminality requirement. The double criminality
requirement is really only important when the two legal cultures involved in the
extradition vary greatly. Here, Chile and Peru are neighboring countries in South
America that have similar civil law systems. See GEOFF GILBERT, ASPECTS OF
ExTRADITION LAW 48-52 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1991).
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legislature's exact definition does not bar the extradition
request. 4 ' Moreover, the court notes that neither the Peruvian
law nor the Chilean law on extradition demand such an identical
match of the elements of the crime."'
3. Statute of Limitations
Next, the defense claims that extradition is improper because
the statute of limitations has run on the alleged crimes. The
defense outlines four reasons why the statute of limitations has
run. First, Peru erroneously classified several of the offenses as
felonies instead of misdemeanors, essentially doubling the statute
of limitations.4  The defense notes that for example, "fraude fis
cal" or treasury fraud is a simple misdemeanor in Chile.' Sec-
ond, Peru argues that the suspension of the statute of limitations
in these cases should begin from the day Fujimori abandoned the
presidency or the day Congress banned him from holding office in
Peru. 4 4 The defense rebuts that this flies in the face of the
express language of article 96 of the Chilean Criminal Code,
which says that the statute of limitations continues to run if after
three years from the date of its suspension the prosecution has
failed to convict the accused.'45 Since Fujimori fled from justice
over five years ago, according to the defense, the statute of limita-
tions has run. Third, Peru erroneously applied the statute of limi-
tations rules of article 100 of the Chilean Criminal Code, which
count one day for every two days when the accused is outside the
jurisdiction of the requesting state. The defense cleverly notes
that even if this was the correct interpretation of article 100,
many of the cases against Fujimori had the statute of limitations
run on them anyway.'46 Finally, they claim that Peru incorrectly
listed the dates of the alleged criminal acts that were used to
determine if the statute of limitations had run.'47
In compliance with the bilateral treaty, to determine the
application of the statute of limitations for the alleged crimes the
domestic laws of the requested state should be applied.148 In
140. GILBERT, supra note 139 at 9.
141. Id.
142. See Def.'s Resp. to Extradition Req. 26.
143. See Def.'s Resp. to Extradition Req. 27.
144. See Def.'s Resp. to Extradition Req. 28.
145. See Def.'s Resp. to Extradition Req. 29.
146. See Def's Resp. to Extradition Req. 32-34.
147. See Def's Resp. to Extradition Req. 34.
148. See CSJN, "Extradici6n de Fujimori," at 9.
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Chile, the determination of the correct statute of limitations is
based on whether or not the accused is still in the territory where
the crimes were committed or if he has fled."' Article 100 of the
Chilean Code of Criminal Procedure proclaims that when the
accused is not present in the country where the acts were commit-
ted the statute of limitations doubles 5 ° because his departure
from the country makes it difficult to find him and prosecute
him.'," On the other hand, the Chilean procedure for extradition
also depicts extradition as a process based upon international
treaties and judicial assistance from the respective states.'52 The
Court elaborates that the purpose of cooperation between states is
to avoid a miscarriage of justice by letting a crime go unpunished
simply because the accused has fled the state's jurisdiction."3 For
that reason and in accordance with the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties,"' a treaty should be interpreted in good faith
with the purpose of attributing to its terms a reasonable applica-
tion in light of the ends sought."' With that said, while it is true
that a court reviewing an extradition request should take into con-
sideration domestic law, that same domestic law should be recon-
ciled with international instruments of extradition so that in
conserving the principle of mutual assistance between nations and
the conservation of the judicial order, justice will be served and
impunity will be avoided." 6 With respect to the claim that the
statute of limitations has run, the Court holds that, in this case,
the statute of limitations was correctly applied.
The defense cleverly tries to sidestep the application of article
100's doubling effect by claiming that it is only applicable when
Chile is requesting the extradition from another country and not
when the extradition is being requested from Chile. The Court
employs the basic international principles of equality and reci-
procity between nation states to refute the claim, noting that Peru
is entitled to the same treatment that it would afford Chile in the
149. Id.
150. See C6d. Proc. Pen. art. 100 (Chile).
151. See CSJN, "Extradici6n de Fujimori," at 9-10. The rationale for this rule is
even stronger here when you take into account the fact that in Peru trials in absentia
are not permitted. See HRW Dec. 2005 Report, supra note 48.
152. See CSJN, "Extradici6n de Fujimori," at 11.
153. Id.
154. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(1), May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331.
155. See CSJN, "Extradici6n de Fujimori," at 11.
156. See CSJN, "Extradici6n de Fujimori," at 12. The Court goes on to cite in
support of this theory, the bilateral extradition treaty between the two states. Id.
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area of extradition and Chile should be prepared to facilitate this,
especially when, according to Chilean law, the statute of limita-
tions has not run."' The Court emphasizes that furthermore,
these principles are expressly provided for in the preamble to the
extradition treaty between Peru and Chile.'58 In addition, article 4
of the treaty states that if the perpetrator is not extradited, the
requested state has the obligation to try him under the laws of
that state as if he had committed the alleged acts there.'59 The
Court arrives at the conclusion that, in harmony with the treaty's
call for reciprocity between nation states, article 100 applies, with
the statute of limitations beginning to run from the day the
accused sought to evade justice in Peru. 60
4. Substantive Issues
The defense alleges overt substantive violations of Fujimori's
rights, such as his right to due process, presumption of innocence
until proven guilty and general principles of extradition and crim-
inal law.' 6 ' The Court reasons that Fujimori was awarded due
process of law because he was aware of the charges against him
and was provided with an adequate defense both here and in
Peru.'62 With respect to the alleged violations of the general prin-
ciples of extradition and criminal law, such as proportionality,
ultima ratio and specialty, the Court brushes them aside as sub-
stantive issues, which can only be determined by the Peruvian
court that will try Fujimori for his crimes. 163 The Court's refusal
to address any substantive issues encapsulates the fact that extra-
dition is a mere process to follow before the accused may be tried
on the merits."M In an extradition proceeding it is not the Court's
job to formulate an opinion concerning the guilt of the accused.'65
157. See CSJN, "Extradici6n de Fujimori," at 10-11.
158. Extradition Treaty, supra note 5, at Preamble. "Los Gobiernos de Chile y
Perd, con el prop6sito de asegurar la acci6n eficaz de la justicia penal en sus
respectivos paises, mediante la represi6n de los delitos cometidos en el territorio de
cualquiera de ellos por individuos que busquen refugio en el del otro, han convenido
en celebrar un Tratado de Extradici6n que establezca reglas fijas y basadas en
principios de reciprocidad ......
159. Extradition Treaty, supra note 5, at art. IV.
160. See CSJN, "Extradici6n de Fujimori," at 11.
161. See Def.'s Resp. to Extradition Req. 59, 82.
162. See CSJN, "Extradici6n de Fujimori," at 5-6.
163. Id.
164. See sources cited supra note 117. Extradition is a procedural instrument used
between nations to assist each other in the area of criminal justice. Id.
165. See Extradition Treaty, supra note 5, at art. XIII. Article XIII refers to
extradition as a procedure.
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This basic concept was what seemed to have eluded the Court of
First Instance below when it incorrectly applied the evidentiary
standard."' s As far as the alleged infringement of Fujimori's pre-
sumption of innocence, the Court once again categorizes this as a
substantive issue that should be addressed by the Peruvian court
at his trial.167
5. Evidentiary Findings
After finding that the extradition request meets both the pro-
cedural requirements of the extradition treaty in force and inter-
national law, the Court individually addresses Peru's thirteen
cases"' in order to determine first, if the nature of the alleged
crime is the same in both countries,'169 and then second, if they
conform to the article 647(3) requirement of the Chilean procedure
for extradition. Article 647(3) requires that the Court look at the
actual evidence supporting the charges to determine if there is
probable cause to believe that the accused participated in the
extraditable acts, either directly, as an accomplish, or as an acces-
sory after the fact. 70 This is the same standard that is required to
indict someone if the crime would have been committed in Chile. 7'
The standard for reviewing such evidence is what is at issue on
appeal, as the Court of First Instance found that that evidence did
not support a finding that Fujimori participated in the crimes
either directly or indirectly. 72 The ex-president's defense vigor-
ously demands that the standard of proof used to assess the evi-
dence in each case be "preuba plena de responsiblidad" or
conclusive evidence of his responsibility. Yet the Supreme Court
holds strong in accordance with its past precedence that it only
need affirm the actual existence of the crime itself and that there
be a sound presumption that the defendant participated in the
act.173 It should also be noted that according to article 365(1) of
166. See HRW Flawed Decision, supra note 98.
167. See CSJN, "Extradici6n de Fujimori," at 12.
168. The original extradition request contained twelve charges, but after the lower
court's decision Peru submitted a thirteenth charge called "Ampliaci6n por
desaparici6n forzada" or kidnapping.
169. This is otherwise known as the principle of double criminality in international
extradition law. See supra Part III.D.ii.
170. See C6d. Proc. Pen. art. 647(3) (Chile).
171. See C6d. Proc. Pen. art. 274 (Chile).
172. See Corte de Primera Instancia [CPI], 11/7/2007, "Extradici6n de Fujimori /
negando extradici6n," 97-98, (5646-2005) (Chile), available at http://www.emol.coml
noticias/documentos/pdfs/FalloMinalvarezFujimori.pdf.
173. See CSJN, "Extradici6n de Fujimori," at 5.
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the Bustamante Code, only circumstantial evidence of the person's
guilt need be shown. 7 4 Such circumstantial evidence may include
a simple arrest warrant or like document from the requesting
state. Neither of these standards requires conclusive evidence of
the person's guilt however. The Court emphasizes that the Peru-
vian extradition request surpasses the Bustamante Code's lenient
requirements, evidencing a sound previous investigation concern-
ing the facts before an indictment and arrest warrant for Fujimori
were issued.'75 It is clear that the Peruvian request has exceeded
the demands of the Chilean procedural requirements for
extradition.
Of the seven cases approved for prosecution in Peru, five of
them were for gross acts of corruption.'76 The court examined the
evidence presented for each case and decided that in accordance
with article 647(3)'s evidentiary standard it is sufficient to pre-
sume Fujimori's involvement in or instigation of the illicit acts. 77
Despite Fujimori's assertions of innocence and ignorance of the
corruption that went on in his government, the evidence against
him is extensive and detailed, ranging from witness testimony
from top government officials, official documents and taped con-
versations. 17  The Supreme Court's decision thus constitutes an
important step in the fight against corruption in Latin America.
179
This new found pastime of Latin American presidents has led to
many international treaties and agreements that advocate inter-
national cooperation to combat and repress corruption in a more
effective manner.8 ' Included among these international mecha-
174. See Bustamante Code, supra note 135, at art. 365(1).
175. See CSJN, "Extradici6n de Fujimori," at 5.
176. Caso Allanamiento, Caso Intercepci6n Telef6nica, Caso Tractores Chinos y
Medios de Comunicaci6n, Caso 15 Millones and Caso Congresistas Trdnsfugas.
177. See CSJN, "Extradicifn de Fujimori," at 22-23, 46-47, 72-73, 101-02, 113-14.
178. Id.
179. In the last several years corruption has become an international concern, as
Latin American presidents rise to power, rob the country blind and slip away to
Europe or another Latin American country to enjoy their wealth. See Ronald
Gamarra Herrera, A prop6sito de la hist6rica extradici6n de Alberto Fujimori,
DERECHOPENAL (Chile), December 27, 2007, at 8, available at http://www.unifr.chl
ddpl/derechopenal/novedades.htm.
180. Id. at 8-9. Of importance here, Chile has signed and ratified the Inter-
American Convention Against Corruption, which sets forth in its article XIII that
extradition is an appropriate measure to take when dealing with gross acts of
corruption. Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, Mar. 29, 1996, 35 I.L.M.
724, Art. XIII. More recently, the General Assembly of the Organization of American
States approved a resolution that made a call to the international community to stop
giving sanctuary to government officials who used their political power to commit acts
of corruption and to facilitate the return of these officials to their countries so that
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nisms to stop corruption is the cooperation between nation states,
specifically the assistance of the judiciary through various judicial
procedures like extradition.'81
The five corruption cases 182 that were denied illustrate that
the additional requirements in Chilean procedural law sometimes
frustrate the international cooperation efforts by Latin America to
effectively prosecute acts of corruption. In each of these five cases
the Court determines that there is not enough evidence to connect
Fujimori directly or indirectly to these crimes.1 1 3 In addition,
many of the crimes he is accused of are found not to warrant the
granting of an extradition request, as they either do not have jail
time as a sanction or are not legally punishable acts at all."4
Regardless, the Court's careful deliberations before denying sev-
eral of the charges display attempts to follow the international
principles of extradition and apply them fairly to a case that has
received great criticism and scrutiny by the international
community.
The Court's decision to extradite ultimately rests upon the
human rights charges. The two major cases involving grave viola-
tions of human rights are the Barrios Altos and La Cantuta
cases. 5 With respect to these cases, Fujimori claims that his title
as Chief of the Armed Forces is merely a constitutionally man-
dated title, and that he never knew of the existence of Grupo
Colina, a secret death squad, until after the terrible massacres at
Barrios Altos and La Cantuta occurred.8 6 In addition, he claims
that neither the armed forces nor the national police took orders
directly from him as President, and that he was blind to his right
hand man's intentions in creating Grupo Colina.18' The Court con-
troverts, claiming that after his self-coup he possessed the concen-
trated powers of all three branches of government, including that
they may be tried in front of national courts. Herrera, supra note 179, at 9 (citing AG/
RES. 2022 (XXXIV-O/04)).
181. See Herrera, supra note 179, at 9.
182. Caso pago Sunat-Borobio, Caso Faisal, Caso Medicinas Chinas, Caso
Desviacion de Fondos, and Caso Decretos de Urgencia WE NEED CITATIONS
183. See CSJN, "Extradici6n de Fujimori," at 31-33, 55-56, 65-66, 84-85, 135, 197.
184. Id. at 55-56, 65. In the case "Tractores Chinos" Fujimori is accused of
circumventing the correct administrative body and directly purchasing agricultural
equipment from a Chinese company. To this the Court responds that the acts
described in the extradition request may only be thought of as misadministration and
do not constitute criminally punishable acts. Id. at 65.
185. These two cases were unanimously decided by all the judges.
186. CSJN, "Extradici6n de Fujimori," at 176-77.
187. Id. at 176.
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of Chief of the Armed Forces. As a consequence, he is guilty based
on the fact that although he did not participate directly in the
alleged acts, he is the mastermind behind the plan and had exten-
sive knowledge of the horrific acts being committed by his govern-
ment's agents . 8  Additionally, there exists clear evidence that
Fujimori created the special death squad, Grupo Colina, and gave
them orders to carry out operations against subversives.8 9
Fujimori's degree of participation in these horrific crimes is
that of perpetrator by means. 9 ° The Supreme Court uses Claus
Roxin's theory of criminal participation to determine the responsi-
bility of perpetrators by means who commit crimes against
humanity.' Roxin's theory states that an individual is also a per-
petrator of the crime when they have control over the criminal act
through their position of power in an organization.'92 The Court
notes that while the concept of perpetrator by means is not as
hotly a discussed topic as before, a perpetrator by means is one
who through the control of another's will commits a criminal act.9 3
Roxin's theory describes the case at hand precisely. Fujimori's
hierarchically structured, executive- centered government exe-
cuted a plan that was devised by Fujimori himself. The existence
of a power structure is what Roxin's theory uses to hold the true
author of the criminal acts responsible. The Court concludes that
the concentration of an organization's power in one actor affirms
who the perpetrator by means is, the executor of the organiza-
tion's power.'94 The Supreme Court's decision thus affirms the
188. Id. at 177-178.
189. Id. at 177. The Peruvian extradition request contains evidence in the form of
testimony from various government officials who saw Fujimori give Montesinos
orders concerning Grupo Colina, military achievements and promotions awarded the
various members of Grupo Colina from Fujimori as head of the armed forces and
testimony from the members of Grupo Colina who carried out the horrific acts. Id. at
162-75.
190. "[Tlhose who direct the killing are still killers, even if the actions are carried
out by responsible agents." GEORGE P. FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL LAW
199 (Oxford University Press 1998). This degree of criminal participation has been
used to find those who use the rank-and-file to commit crimes, like mafia leaders and
heads of dictorial states, liable. Id.
191. CSJN, "Extradici6n de Fujimori," at 178.
192. See Herrera, supra note 179, at 11. Roxin's theory has been used by courts
throughout Latin America over the years. For example, in Peru, this theory was used
to find Abimael Guzman, leader of the terrorist group Sendero Luminoso, responsible
for the group's horrific crimes. Also, in Chile, the Court used the theory to override
Pinochet's head-of-state immunity for the assassinations of various individuals in
several cases. Id.
193. CSJN, "Extradici6n de Fujimori," at 178.
194. See id. at 178-79.
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responsibility of heads of states in human rights violations as a
consequence of their control over the state (the organizational
power structure).
Sotanos SIE is another human rights case consisting of indi-
vidual cases of torture and kidnapping that took place in the base-
ment of the SIE (Army Intelligence Service), where coincidently
Fujimori also lived with his family in 1992 because he feared for
his safety.195 Once again Fujimori denies any knowledge of the
torture that was carried out against ex-members of government
and journalists in the basement of the SIE.'96 The evidence
against him is nonetheless overwhelming in this case. Aside from
the fact that Fujimori lived at the SIE, he also converted the intel-
ligence agency into a meeting house for the central government.
Fujimori held all of his meetings with top officials from the mili-
tary there, where they planned the terrible acts to be carried out
by Grupo Colina.'97 One of the abused who was kept tied up in the
basement of the SIE actually saw Fujimori passing through with a
group of Asian men one day. In addition, several employees that
worked there claimed to have seen prison cells in the basement
with prisoners in them.'98 One employee actually saw a small
incinerator with the remains of human parts in it.' 99 Fujimori's
defense claims that regardless of the evidence, the statute of limi-
tations is said to have run on these crimes. The Court reasons
that the statute of limitations has not run because according to
article 96 of the Chilean Criminal Code, the statute of limitations
is suspended with the commission of a new crime.20 Here, three
years into the five year statute of limitations for the crimes com-
mitted in the basement of the SIE Fujimori used illegal wiretap-
ping to listen in on journalists and opposing party members'
phone conversations, ultimately tolling the statute of limitations
on the torture cases.20' This maneuvering around the statute of
limitations is consistent with international law and the Inter-
195. Id. at 135-38. One of the cases involved the kidnapping and torture of his ex-
wife, Susana Higushi Miyagawa. Miyagawa testified that she was kidnapped and
brought to the SIE basement where she was brutally hit, kept half-naked and
drugged. Once she was set free and told Fujimori what they had done to her, he
refused to initiate an investigation and spent the rest of their marriage convincing
her that none of it had ever happened. Id.
196. Id. at 152-53.
197. Id. at 135-36.
198. Id. at 142-45.
199. Id. at 144.
200. C6d. Pen. art. 96 (Chile).
201. CSJN, "Extradici6n de Fujimori," at 152-56.
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American Court's jurisprudence on crimes against humanity,
which call for the abolishment of the statute of limitations
altogether. °2
IV. CONCLUSION
The manner in which Latin America has dealt with gross vio-
lations of human rights is a major theme and challenge for the
democratic transition project."0 3 Over the last few decades, Latin
America has shown willingness to prosecute government officials
who violate human rights and seek to evade justice.2"4 The result
has been a strong movement against impunity. Surprisingly
enough, those who seek justice for victims of human rights viola-
tions are not international organizations or courts, but domestic
courts. Notably, the Argentine judiciary led the Latin American
courts with some of the first trials against military officials for the
appalling acts committed during the "dirty war." The Argentine
courts were also one of the first to throw out the amnesty laws
enacted by the military to shield themselves from prosecution, and
to give precedence to international law in human rights trials.0 5
Similar events are currently occurring in Chile, beginning with
the example of Pinochet and more recently with the extradition of
Fujimori. One question still remains however, why have other
Latin American courts not had the same success as in Argentina
and Chile?206
202. See sources cited supra note 109.
203. The possibilities for actually achieving justice and accountability for human
rights violations in most countries are conditioned on and constrained by the terms
and pace of democratic transition. See Edward Newman, Reconciliation, in
DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA: (RE) CONSTRUCTING POLITICAL SOCIETY 188, 188
(Manuel Antonio Garreton & Edward Newman ed., 2001). Alternatively, while the
deficiencies in dealing with past human rights violations may not threaten the
democratic transition in Latin America, the issue is still central to the reconstruction
of a political society. See id. at 189. In fact, the precise success of this transition is
the effective management of past human rights violations. Id.
204. See The International Federation for Human Rights 36th World Congress,
Lisbon, Port., April 23-25, 2007, Impunity in Peru and the Extradition of Fujimori to
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While Latin America has generally been thought of through-
out the years as heavily controlled by one branch of government,
the executive, a quiet but impactful third branch of government
has been making headway since the early 1990s in Argentina and
Chile. °7 Major constitutional reforms have increased the power of
the judiciary and granted it greater independence, which in turn
has encouraged victims of human rights violations to come for-
ward and demand justice.0 8 Until recently, the Chilean judiciary
was thought to have zero autonomy. In fact, before the 1997 con-
stitutional amendment requiring congressional approval of the
President's nominees to the Supreme Court, the executive was
free to fill the Court with as many political puppets as it
pleased. 0 9 Aside from constitutional judicial independence, 10
actual independence vis- A-vis the executive's practices also
increases the probability the courts will protect individual rights.
Factors that have contributed to a more autonomous judiciary are:
the finality of court decisions, the courts' exclusive authority to
decide cases, bans against military courts, adequate fiscal
resources for the courts, and greater isolation from political pres-
sure.211 If the same factors are present in other Latin American
countries as they are in Chile and Argentina, soon we will see
more prosecutions of human rights violators throughout Latin
America.2 2
The notion is that as the judiciary feels less controlled by the
other branches of government, they become more comfortable
adjudicating cases on the merits. Thus, a strong independent
analyzing reparation claims by victims' families. Human Rights Watch, Brazil:
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2007/08/3 1/brazill6783_txt.htm.
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and its Effects on Corruption, Dissertation at 53, available at http://homepages.nyu.
edu/-jrf246/Papers/PhD%20Diss%20JRF.pdf. Previous to the 1997 constitutional
amendment, the judicial budget, the number of judges, and the jurisdiction of the
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210. While nearly every Latin American Constitution has a clause guaranteeing an
independent judiciary, the reality is that the level of judicial independence in Latin
America is very low. Id. at 48.
211. See Linda Camp Keith, Judicial Independence and Human Rights Protection
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judiciary is the key to achieving less government corruption and
better protection for human rights. 213 Essentially, the more dis-
connected the judiciary is from political control, the more demo-
cratic and fair a nation becomes. Through the case at hand, the
Chilean judiciary is paving the way for other Latin American
courts to aspire towards achieving greater judicial involvement in
human rights and corruption problems, ultimately facilitating the
democratic transition in Latin America.
213. See Rios-Figueroa, supra note 209 at 1.
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